In Re the Matter of:			7-42199	(ESS)
THEMA T. N	ORTON,		Brooklyn,	
	Debtor.	:	July 6, 2	022
In Re the Matter of:			20-01113	(ESS)
NORTON v.	CANN, et al. Plaintiffs,	: : E	Brooklyn, July 6, 2	NY 022
THEMA T. N	Defendant.			
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PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Calling matters one and two on the calendar, Thema T. Norton and Norton versus Cann et al, main case number 17-42199 and adversary proceeding number 20-1113. Connected is Mr. Friedberg, Mr. Dahiya and Mr. Norton. If I could just please remind the parties to state your name each time before speaking?

THE COURT: All right.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. And I apologize for the discourtesy of interrupting you, Mr. Friedberg. Once we're on the record it's helpful for Ms. Jackson to say that, get your appearances on the record and anything you'd like to add as well. Mr. Friedberg, for ECP Property?

MR. FRIEDBERG: Yes, Your Honor. I do apologize in advance, I am fighting a terrible cold, upper respiratory infection so if I start coughing and sneezing I apologize in advance.

THE COURT: I'm sorry to hear that. I hope you're okay. Please -- I will be having -- I have both coffee and water on my bench. Please feel free to get the same. If a glass of orange juice would help do that too. I hope you're -- I hope you're well. If you need a break at some point we'll do that.

Mr. Dahiya, your appearance on the record please? Mr.

Dahiya, may we get your appearance on the record please? Mr. Dahiya, I'm not hearing you. Mr. Friedberg, are you hearing 2 Mr. Dahiya? 3 MR. FRIEDBERG: I am not, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Ms. Jackson, are you hearing Mr. Dahiya? THE CLERK: No. And his - his line doesn't show up as 6 7 being muted. Mr. Dahiya? Maybe something on --THE COURT: Mr. Norton, good to see you. 8 MR. NORTON: Yes, Judge, it's good to see you too. 9 (Inaudible). 10 THE COURT: I can hear Mr. Norton. There we go. Mr. 11 Friedberg, you'll encourage us all to keep --12 MR. NORTON: (Inaudible). 13 THE COURT: Drinking our water. 14 15 MR. DAHIYA: Your Honor, can you hear me now? THE COURT: Yes. I don't know what you fixed, but it 16 made a difference. Thank you so much. Glad to hear your 17 voices and see your faces. I still miss seeing you in Court. 18 We have on the calendar today in the Thema Norton 19 20 Chapter 7 case a motion directed to the proof of claim, 21 pretrial conference and the adversary proceeding. The goal 22 today is to hear your argument and work through any issues that 23 we can make progress on in the motion with respect to the proof of claim, motion to strike brought by the debtor. 24

At some point we noted that there was a service issue

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because we'd like to see service on the Chapter 7 trustee, Counsel for the trustee. They were served by e-mail, but the 2 U.S. Trustee who gets service of everything doesn't seem to 3 have been served. I think it would be helpful to get that 4 5 service accomplished. We'll double, triple check that. That's still a loose end here we think, still seems to be a loose end 6 7 here. So, Mr. Dahiya I will ask you to serve, but I don't think that's --8 MR. DAHIYA: Your Honor, --9 THE COURT: An impediment to hearing the argument 10 today. 11 MR. DAHIYA: I did serve --12 THE COURT: The U.S.T.? 13 MR. DAHIYA: (Inaudible) yes, because you instructed 14 me last time to serve --15 THE COURT: I know. 16

MR. DAHIYA: The U.S.T., I remember.

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THE COURT: Okay. So maybe we've got that service.

Did you file a certificate of service or an updated certificate of service?

MR. DAHIYA: It looks like I'm not sure about that. That I might have made (inaudible).

THE COURT: All right. Please do. First of all, most important, I'm glad that service was made. Second, if you could file something confirming that just so we have a complete

record that would be very helpful. And unless there's a reason not to I would like to proceed with argument. Mr. Norton, I 2 see your hand. 3 MR. NORTON: I can't hear. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Norton, is your hand raised for a 5 6 reason? 7 MR. NORTON: Yes, I had tried to get in touch with my (inaudible) hospital. 8 THE COURT: I'm sorry, she's in the hospital? 9 MR. NORTON: My wife said that she thinks she's at the 10 hospital. 11 THE COURT: It's -- well, I want to do my best to 12 accommodate the participation or attendants of the parties who 13 wish to be here and I know that in the past often Ms. Norton 14 15 has attended. Mr. Norton, Mr. Dahiya you are the father and lawyer for the debtor respectively. 16 MR. DAHIYA: I think we can proceed without her, Your 17 Honor, it is all right to --18 THE COURT: All right. If you'd like to confer 19 briefly offline with your client Mr. Norton just to be sure 20 21 that everyone is comfortable with that I'll give you a couple of minutes to do that. I'm eager to proceed if we can, but I 22 also wanna do it in a way that respects everyone's preferences. 23 MR. DAHIYA: Thank you, Judge. That's all right. 24

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, --

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MR. DAHIYA: That's all right.

THE COURT: Mr. Norton, I hope everything is okay and if she's able to join at any time of course she's welcome to do that. Mr. Dahiya, it's your motion. Is there anything that would be helpful to address in the bigger context first including the adversary proceeding or shall I - shall I hear your argument?

MR. DAHIYA: Thank you, Your Honor. There's nothing else, we just straight away --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DAHIYA: Can go to the merits --

THE COURT: Please proceed.

MR. DAHIYA: Of the motion. Yes, Your Honor. Nothing else (inaudible) other than the motion (inaudible), Your Honor at this point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DAHIYA: I (inaudible) this case, this motion that's been adjourned several, several times, it's been extensively briefed and argued.

THE COURT: It was originally on to be heard on May 3rd and I think that was the next most prior date and maybe the only prior date. It doesn't matter. We are where we are. My impression is the issues have been before the parties for some time, the motion has been before the Court on May 3rd and now today.

Perhaps it would be helpful just to have a complete record if you could summarize the grounds. I - I -- summarize the grounds for the relief that you seek. I think I'm familiar with the issues, but we're about to hear from Mr. Friedberg in opposition and maybe it would make sense to have I guess the key points of your argument.

I take it that it turns in substance on the legal grounds that the statute of limitations is an obstacle to the collection of this debt and, therefore, the claim should be stricken, is that right?

MR. DAHIYA: That's one of the arguments. Your Honor, the proof of claim was filed on 4th of March, 2021 and then it was subsequently amended July 21st of 2021. The motions were filed (inaudible) motion was filed and finally we are here today. I think the motion has been extensively briefed, Your Honor.

The issue is - the issue is of law at this point because if you see the proof of claim which has been filed in this case, Your Honor it's basically a conversion claim. What they did was they also attached the file (inaudible) copy of the complaint and I was kind of confused about it. And so they rested on us to find out like finding a needle in a haystack to understand what could be the basis of the claim although they didn't have to understand it's conversion.

Anyway, despite that what I did, Your Honor was I

looked at all the filings, the complaints, I looked at the (inaudible) of the claims filed in the complaint and this is how I prepared my response.

The bottom line, Your Honor is it's a (inaudible) there's nothing factual here, the normal issue is it's all covered by your judgment in re Southside LLC, it's a 2012 474 DR 391, it's your judgment, Your Honor very, you know, very beautifully done judgment.

It talks about the issue as to when rents become property of the holder, Your Honor. Your Honor states unlike Madeline which is a (inaudible) state, Your Honor. The rents (inaudible) Your Honor and to the extent that title remains that is the owner of the property. Conversion takes place when the other party is the lawful owner, Your Honor. You have to have ownership and then he should make a demand (inaudible) make a demand and it should be denied.

So let's imagine the fact that a demand was made in 2011, (inaudible), paperwork filed, Your Honor. (Inaudible) that's not a demand and you could say it's a demand, that it's their rent and, you know, but that's 2011 (inaudible) that is also the rent (inaudible), the notice claim, the contact claim.

So, Your Honor the (inaudible) the ownership belongs to the debtor. Assuming it belongs to the debtor the debtor could easily (inaudible) and you could say that's a breach of the contract. In New York State, Your Honor breach of a

contract does not (inaudible) damage claims. Debt created by contract (inaudible) judgment that's (inaudible) the judgment now. The debt created by contract much as in the judgment is not to (inaudible).

The issue is the (inaudible) what exactly was the contract, the contract (inaudible), Your Honor. Now I don't know what they're using. They filed a complaint which was not prosecuted in the previous case and (inaudible) and the back and forth (inaudible) interest of the rental payments, Your Honor. So other part is, Your Honor the issue of (inaudible) in briefs that, you know, those claims cannot be assigned away, the contract claims (inaudible) in the rental payments, but that's not a (inaudible) assignment, Your Honor. (Inaudible) that the proof of claim was filed (inaudible) trustee to discovery, you know, basically because Mr. Friedberg I believe they started a State Court action and they benefitted the warranted discovery from this Court so that it could be utilized.

And that's what they've done successfully, creating an interest of the trustee when the proof of claim in this case does not exceed \$10,000, Your Honor. Anyway, this is what it is, that's the nature of the - nature of the proceedings.

Also, you need to understand, Your Honor I mean we cannot (inaudible) lawfully taken by the (inaudible) in this case and also the (inaudible).

Unless you have questions, Your Honor it's a very simple -- I have nothing else to add in this case. The last thing I could read is from the judgment (inaudible) of its title and release of property until the same is actually conducted.

Your Honor, there was no appointment of a receiver, there was no (inaudible). The events that they're complaining about, the collection extends the time, there was no appointment of a receiver, there was - it's not a (inaudible) talk about it before (inaudible) took over the property in the claim (inaudible) doesn't belong to that claim, Your Honor.

So, Your Honor unless you have questions for me I have nothing else to - nothing left to say.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Dahiya. I do have a couple of questions. I just wanna be sure I understand the parties' position on a couple of things. First, and I think we know this from the prior hearing, but it's your position that no further discovery is needed at this point, we're done, you're ready for this to be decided, is that correct?

MR. DAHIYA: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Friedberg I'll have the same question for you when it's your turn. Next, you rely on the statute of limitations. I wanna be sure I understand when you think that statute began to run. Limitations has to run for

some time. When would that be? You pointed to different limitations periods. When did it start to run?

MR. DAHIYA: Your Honor, this is a question for --

THE COURT: It's a question for you.

MR. DAHIYA: A question for me?

THE COURT: I think - I think you argued that the statute of limitations is a bar here or is an obstacle that can't be overcome and so my question is when did the statute begin to run.

MR. DAHIYA: The date of the (inaudible) demands, of the demand started in 2011, Your Honor and (inaudible) one of the claims that we have that there is no proper viable claim against the debtor. It started with the demand for the payment of the contract, for the mortgage payment. Also, Your Honor there's no (inaudible) of this proof of claim to add to my arguments because they didn't attach a copy of the lease. They were supposed to attach a copy of the lease.

Also, I think there was a judgment obtained by the debtors (inaudible) so I don't know how they came to this number \$200,000 or whatever number they came to, (inaudible). This is speculation so (inaudible) at this point, Your Honor (inaudible) create a viable claim.

THE COURT: All right. And I guess another question I had was, and I may have raised this with the parties before, of course the Supreme Court in Midland Funding case addressed a

situation with the proof of claim and a question of statute of limitations defense. I'm sure you know the case. How should 2 -- how if it all does that case fit in here? 3 MR. DAHIYA: No, it doesn't fit it. (Inaudible) the 4 5 issue very simply was the (inaudible) claim if you could have a claim (inaudible) that was all. The Supreme Court talks about 6 7 it that the debtor can (inaudible) sanctions or other means to complain. 8 There are other safeguards in bankruptcy which are not 9 outside. If the debtor said well, you don't have (inaudible) 10 claim (inaudible) that is confined to a claim if it's deemed 11 timely. 12 13 Let's say hypothetically it was a proper claim, you need to have - you still need to have a proper claim. 14 not about the issue of - issue of the enforceability of the 15 claim, the issue was very different if you can charge the 16 17 (inaudible). That in fact doesn't belong in here, Your Honor. It doesn't apply to our (inaudible). 18 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else you 19 20 think is important for the Court to hear from you at this time 21 or shall we hear from Mr. Friedberg? MR. DAHIYA: You can -- Your Honor, I think I 22 23 summarized everything. THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Friedberg, over to you. 24

MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. Jeremy

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Friedberg, on behalf of ECP Property II, LLC. As a preliminary matter I'd just point out that since Mr. Dahiya has waived any discovery here I would assume that the proof of claim is going to be dealt with on its face and the facts would be - would be true as asserted in the proof of claim and we're just dealing with legal issues as Mr. Dahiya said.

So the standard for allowing for proof of claim - by the way, Your Honor I'm gonna address all your questions in a moment that you just asked Mr. Dahiya.

THE COURT: Whatever order works for you is fine with me. Please proceed.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. The standard for allowing a proof of claim is very low in Rule 3001 and it's our contention that the adversary complaint attached to the main claim is sufficient to clear that low bar and the (inaudible) must be denied. The adversary complaint contains two elements required to establish a valid claim which are basically to put the debtor on notice of the basis of the claim and the amount of the claim.

The adversary complaint describes in detail the basis of the claim, describing in detail debtor's conversion, what's at issue, the amount of the claim now with interest is \$206,000, the conversation was about \$146,000 worth of - worth of funds.

Our claim is it's not a contract claim, it's a claim

that Ms. Norton personally converted (inaudible) from the (inaudible) LLC which was the debtor that ECP sued and she personally converted them and that is the basis of our adversary complaint. That's uncontroverted because we didn't do any discovery.

THE COURT: And when did she do that according to the claim and the complaint?

MR. FRIEDBERG: So this is - this is very, very important, Your Honor. ECP's claim is based on from the date they purchased this loan forward, it's not based on 2011, 2012 or 2013. ECP's claim the earliest date of its claim would have been September 3rd, 2014 when it bought - when it bought this loan.

Those are the only rents that are being claimed, no back rents prior to ECP's ownership of this loan were claimed in the adversary proceeding against Ms. Norton. I'll just address that while talking about that.

The statute of limitations has not expired because the earliest date on this claim - the earliest date on which the claim arose would be September 3rd, 2014. Ms. Norton's first bankruptcy was September 22nd, 2016 which would have obviously tolled the statute of limitations.

The first bankruptcy was dismissed in April of 2017, her second bankruptcy was filed in May of 2017 so the earliest, forgetting any tolling by the bankruptcies, the earliest

possible date of the expiration of the statute of limitations would have been September 3rd, 2017. The order stayed, she was in bankruptcy and she got her discharge on December 4th, 2017. ECP could not pursue this claim so I don't think the statute of limitations actually applies here.

THE COURT: So it's your argument that even a lapsed statute of limitations would be revived when you bought the loan?

MR. FRIEDBERG: No, the statute of limitations -
THE COURT: That would seem -- I would have to think

about that a little bit, but I would be - I would think about

that a little bit because it would seem to me if it was a

lapsed statute of limitations if a transaction like that could

somehow revive it then a statute of limitations would bring no

repose whatsoever to a prospective debtor - excuse me, a

defendant.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Let me address that, Your Honor to clarify this argument a little bit.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. FRIEDBERG: The assignment of rents -- upon the debtor's default the assignment of rent requires the debtor to pay all of the funds over to the lender so they do have an ownership interest in the rents upon default. So I'm not quite sure I agree with Mr. Dahiya on that point.

We do not -- we are not claiming anything before

September 3rd, 2014 so our claim arose at its earliest

September 3rd, 2014, nothing in our case is for 2011, 2012 or

2013. So there's no claim for any of the rents that might have
been diverted. We don't even know if funds were diverted pre

September 3rd, 2014 because we have no ability to answer that,
we just got this loan September 3rd, 2014. So we're not

claiming any of our predecessors damages, we're just claiming
damages that harmed ECP after its purchase of the loan which
was on September 3rd, 2014. Does that clarify --

THE COURT: And was there a continued -- your argument would then be and the basis for your claim would be that there was a continuing diversion or conversion, a continuing conversion of the rents from then forward?

MR. FRIEDBERG: It goes forward, Your Honor, yes, that is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so --

MR. FRIEDBERG: That's our case.

THE COURT: Is it that -- and now I'm looking at the amended complaint language. Beginning in September, 2014 through the present borrower failed and refused to remit collections of tenant rents to ECP. Were they being collected at that same time or was it that--

MR. FRIEDBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: They previously had been collected, but not turned over?

MR. FRIEDBERG: No, our claim is for rents that were collected and not remitted after September 3rd, 2014. There is no claim for anything pre September, 2014. So the earliest date these claims arose would have been September 3rd, 2014. I hope that clarifies the nature of our claim and --

THE COURT: So it -- and your - and your complaint, this is 17-01037, the adversary proceeding complaint, through the present the complaint refers to paragraph twenty-eight, would be then conversion up to March 20th, 2017. Is that - is that right?

MR. FRIEDBERG: Yes, that's correct. I think that's the date that we ended our ownership of the property.

THE COURT: All right. And then your first claim,

2-1, filed on March 4th, 2021 sounds to me like it's more than

three years after the latest date on which the debtor allegedly

refused to return the rents and that would seem to be a problem

under the statute of limitations. I think we agree --

MR. FRIEDBERG: Well, --

MR. FRIEDBERG: I think - I think the Midland case does apply here, Your Honor and the language in the Midland case is that you look to state law even if the statute of limitations has passed onto whether the claim is extinguished and that's - and in that case they're analyzing Alabama law and Alabama law extinguishes the claim upon the expiration of the

THE COURT: It's a three year statute, is that right?

statute of limitations.

I don't find any case law that says claims are extinguished under New York State law upon expiration of the statute of limitations, you simply can't sue them, but you still have the claim.

THE COURT: So you would - you would argue that yes, the statute expired, no, you could not sue to collect, but nevertheless, and maybe this brings us to the Supreme Court's decision in Midland Funding, it's still a claim, is that right?

MR. FRIEDBERG: No, I disagree. No, I disagree with that. I'll restate my logic one more time. So basically our claim arose in September of 2014. The first bankruptcy was in September of 2016. We sued then for - we filed a claim for conversion.

The case was dismissed six months later which would extended the statute of limitations I believe to - in April of 2017 and the moment we refiled twenty days later in September - in May of 2017.

So the statute of limitations, the 362 could not have collected this debt even though we had a claim and we were in the bankruptcy. If the Court remembers looking at the docket there was no notice of assets or need to proof of claim in the second bankruptcy case and that's because Ms. Norton did not report assets that she allegedly owned according to the trustee's investigation.

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So in addition to the fact that the statute of limitations did not expire and there is no New York law that says the claim is not valid even in light of the expiration of the statute of limitations we also have an issue of equitable estoppel here because under New York law Ms. Norton would be estopped, but including the statute of limitations where the delay was caused by misrepresentation, fraud, deception which caused refraining from a timely action (inaudible) 406 New York State 2nd 259 and for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply the defendant's subsequent intentional and material misrepresentation must have prevented the plaintiff from timely filing the action and that's also in the (inaudible) case and the Court there ruled in favor of the plaintiff when the defendant's subsequent misrepresentation prevented the plaintiff from making a claim.

The debtor -- the issue of wrongdoing was conversion of ECP's rents, ECP timely filed its conversion complaint in the first bankruptcy in the context of - in the (inaudible) cases and in the second case. In the context of this bankruptcy case the debtor obtained a discharge while intentionally concealing assets and that's an issue that the trustee has raised and developed as well.

THE COURT: What's the status of the debtor's discharge in this case? I thought we had a discharge in this case.

MR. FRIEDBERG: The debtor is discharged, that is 1 correct, but the debtor's discharge was obtained through a 2 fraudulent filing. She did not schedule assets that she was -3 for which she was an owner and that's clearly been established 4 5 by the trustee. So if that - if - I believe if --THE COURT: What are you basing that on? That's a 6 7 pretty big statement, Mr. Friedberg. Has the Court concluded that? It's clearly been --8 MR. FRIEDBERG: I don't think so. 9 THE COURT: Established by the trustee according to 10 whom? 11 MR. FRIEDBERG: No, just according to the trustee, 12 not --13 THE COURT: And where is that in the record? 14 MR. FRIEDBERG: The trustee made numerous arguments 15 which is how the trustee saw Ms. Norton's --16 THE COURT: Tell me where it is in the record. 17 MR. FRIEDBERG: Off the top of my head I don't have 18 it, Your Honor. 19 20 THE COURT: Is there still a discharge in this case? MR. FRIEDBERG: Of course. 21 22 THE COURT: Of course? Well, the trustee would 23 probably want to revoke a discharge if the trustee had discovered a massive fraud. 24 MR. FRIEDBERG: I don't think the trustee can revoke 25

discharge after a year.

THE COURT: Well, no, you would probably have to come to the Court.

MR. FRIEDBERG: (Inaudible).

THE COURT: For the avoidance of doubt I'm speaking lightly of something that's deadly serious if there's been a massive fraud perpetrated. Maybe there's a time limit on that, but I haven't come across that in prior cases that I recall as I sit here. So we have a discharged --

MR. FRIEDBERG: I believe --

THE COURT: We have a discharged case, there was a sale by the trustee of an asset I think. This is a point of information. Is this a case where it's anticipated there will be some distribution to creditors?

MR. FRIEDBERG: Yes, the trustee has sold assets for \$50,000.

THE COURT: So -- and I recall that, it was a paramount of attention page of that in the course of the progress of the case. So if I agree with the debtor and your claim is stricken she's got a discharge and you won't get a distribution and perhaps your claim will be discharged.

If I disagree with the debtor and I don't strike your claim then there will be a distribution of some sort because this is an asset case it seems because of that sale and I recall the sale of the interest and the many hearings about

whether there was anything for that interest and ultimately concluding that whatever it was was somebody willing to pay 2 \$50,000 for it. 3 So as - at the risk of beginning of a question in a 4 5 legal argument with the phrase as a practical matter, as a practical matter if your claim is not stricken what happens 6 7 next to ECP's claim? It seems to me it's paid in part and discharged, is that correct, Mr. Friedberg? 8 MR. FRIEDBERG: That is correct, Your Honor. 9 -- that is correct, Your Honor. I just would go back to the 10 fact that the statute of limitations has not expired because 11 the greatest possible expiration of the statute of limitations 12 13 was September 3rd, 2017. Ms. Norton was mid-bankruptcy at that 14 point. THE COURT: When did it begin to run? Your argument 15 is September, 2014 because that's when you --16 17 MR. FRIEDBERG: Correct. THE COURT: Acquired the (inaudible). Mr. Friedberg, 18 something's happened and I can't hear you. 19 20 MR. FRIEDBERG: I'm sorry. Your -- your --THE COURT: There's a tone. 21 22 MR. FRIEDBERG: You got the green box. 23 THE COURT: Yes. If you could repeat what you just said? One of the quirks of this building these days is that 24

from time to time and for no reason of concern there will be a

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tone in the Courtroom and unless I quickly put myself on mute it seems to take over the audio and I apologize for that. Back 2 3 to you. MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. Can you hear 4 5 me? Can you hear me now? THE COURT: Yes, just fine. I think it was caused by 6 7 that tone and I need to be more quick with my mute. MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll just 8 repeat what I said in case you didn't hear it. 9 THE COURT: Please. 10 MR. FRIEDBERG: We're only seeking to recover from 11 funds that were diverted after September 3rd, 2014. 12 earliest possible expiration of the statute of limitations in 13 that case would be September 3rd, 2017, the debtor was in 14 bankruptcy, but with a filing on May 2nd, 2017 and was 15 discharged on December 4th, 2017. So the statute of 16 17 limitations did not expire prior to the bankruptcy filing.

So ECP has a claim in this case because the debtor the debtor was discharged and there were no assets at the time according to - you know, according to the U.S. Trustee at the time.

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So we're not seeking to collect anything that would have been subject to the statute of limitations expiring.

THE COURT: All right. Please continue. I'm looking forward to hearing the debtor's response, but I wanna have your full argument before we move back to Mr. Dahiya.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There's such a disconnect between the chronologies presented by the two parties. I'll sort it out, that's my job, but at least I want to be sure that I understand clearly your respective chronology positions --

MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And where they overlap and where they don't. Back to you.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. The chronology is supported solely by the complaint we filed, the adversary proceeding which is attached to our proof of claim which says from September 3rd, 2014 on. So we're not - you know, once again, we are not claiming anything prior to that.

So let me just -- I think everything else is fairly well briefed, but I wanted to just make the argument that the proof of claim does comply with Rule 2001. The creditor is not required to prove every aspect when it files the proof of claim and Mr. Dahiya is relying on the papers and so there is no controversion of the facts alleged in the adversary complaint.

Additionally, the debtor's attempt to apply the (inaudible) pleading standard is not properly placed here. There's no civil case that we could find nor did the debtor cite one that the (inaudible) standard for Federal Court actions is applied to a proof of claim in bankruptcy. ECP's

instrument upon which the claim is founded, the assignment of rents, and has (inaudible) to the adversary complaint.

claim complies with the rules because it attaches the

Even on its own and absent the context provided by the adversary complaint itself in additional exhibits the assignment of rents establishes ECP's ownership of the rent because the debtor as Mr. Dahiya admitted had been in default since 2011.

Now, with respect to the (inaudible) res judicata and lack of standing, those arguments should all fail as well. The debtor's argument that ECP's tort claim merges into the judgment for breach of contract by three separate parties, the debtor was not a party to the contract.

The cases cited by the debtor which is Duane Reade versus St. Paul would not allow for merger in this action. In Duane Reade, which is cited by the debtor to support her contention the Court held that only claims that are extinguished upon entry of a judgment by those against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction or series of transactions out of which the action arose.

This is not a contract claim, it is a conversion to a claim. ECP's claim has not been made against any of the other debtors or any against - only against out debtor. I apologize, my phone is ringing.

Debtor's related argument that res judicata precludes

a claim should fail as well. Res judicata can only apply to claims which could have been raised in an earlier litigation, but were not. The debtor was not a party to the earlier litigation which was against River Rock Nehemiah and again towards Mr. Norton and (Inaudible) Tech so the claim of conversion could not have been litigated against her in those cases and I would cite the Court to O'Brien versus City of Syracuse, 54 New York 353 for that - for that - to support that assertion.

The debtor cites no case law holding that a tort claim such as a claim for conversion can be merged into a judgment of entirely different parties. Such a holding does not exist under New York law any bankruptcy law because tort claims can and should be held liable for the torts they commit, same if judgment is entered against entirely different parties.

Finally, the debtor's argument relating to ECP's standing should fail as well. ECP's conversion claim accrued when the conversion occurred, not when Banco Popular still owned the loan. I would cite the Court to (Inaudible) versus Christie's, 51 AD 3rd 444.

The debtor's conversion of ECP's rightful property, the tenant rents, could not have occurred when Banco Popular, our predecessor, demanded acceleration of liability in 2011, it could not have occurred - accrued prior to this transfer of the debt to ECP.

1 2

ECP does have standing to bring a conversion claim against the debtor since the debtor unlawfully exuded ownership and control of ECP's rightful property to tenant rents and placed (inaudible) ECP after Banco Popular transferred its interest in the loan documents to ECP.

I think we've addressed the (inaudible) argument, but no New York Court has interpreted CPLR Section 214.3 to determine whether the creditor's right of payment is extinguished or only the revenue of the right to - of suit, to collect the debt after expiration of the limitations period.

THE COURT: I think that brings us right to the point addressed by the Supreme Court in Midland which seems to me to be in substance that, and the Court - the decision speaks for itself, but there's still a proof of claim that could be filed, but there's also a defense that can be asserted which is the statute of limitations so it's not that you can't file a proof of claim, it's that the debtor, the debtor in bankruptcy, may well have a defense, but would need to assert the defense.

Of course a proof of claim is deemed prima facie valid and then there's an objection, the creditor always retains ultimately the burden to show they're entitled to payment, whatever the payment turns out to be in this case which is an asset case and is a case with a discharge. At least that's the current state of the record as I see it.

So it sounds to me like what you're describing is

most, but not all of the path that the Supreme Court charted in that Midland case saying that yes, you can file a proof of claim even via - even for an obligation that would be barred and by statute of limitations, but know that you - there may be a defense asserted as has been here.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Yes, Your Honor, I agree one hundred percent with your analysis, however, the Court in Midland basically said that you could assert an affirmative defense, the statute of limitations and proof of claim with a statute of limitations had expired if under state law, under the law of that state the claim is extinguished.

In Alabama, which is what they're talking about, the Alabama law is clear the claim is extinguished. Once the statute of limitations passes the claim is gone. There's no New York case that can address that.

THE COURT: What's the difference between a claim that's extinguished and a claim that has a defense to payment?

As a practical matter what's the difference? I mean statute of limitations doesn't mean nothing under New York law.

MR. FRIEDBERG: That's true, but you still have a claim. Just because it --

THE COURT: Right, and a defense to payment.

MR. FRIEDBERG: It's a defense to suit, I don't think it's a defense to payment, it's a defense to suit and there's no New York case law that says the claim is extinguished. I

think that's a really fine point to have to address, but I believe the analysis is that the right to sue is gone, but not 2 the claim. You have a right to payment, but --3 4 THE COURT: Do you --MR. FRIEDBERG: You don't have a right to sue. 5 THE COURT: Are you aware of any bankruptcy cases that 6 7 have ruled as you just described in the state of New York applying New York law since Midland was decided? 8 MR. FRIEDBERG: No, there are no cases in New York and 9 there are no New York cases that we could find that talk about 10 extinguishing the claim. (Inaudible) issue of state law 11 clearly the claim is not extinguished because there's no 12 guidance from the statute or from the cases that the claim is 13 extinguished. You just simply can't sue in State Court, that's 14 15 all. You do have a claim and I'll give a good example, Your 16 If they sued ECP, ECP could assert this claim as a set 17 off, that is clear, because even though you can't sue 18 affirmatively you still have a set off as long as you have a 19 20 claim. Now, in Alabama you would not have a claim because --21 THE COURT: And what case law supports that 22 23 interpretation? MR. FRIEDBERG: Because there's no -- well, that's 24

just the standard practice and there's no case law in New

25

York.

THE COURT: I don't practice anymore, Mr. Friedberg, I need a case.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Your Honor, I don't - I do not have a case.

THE COURT: And is that unbounded in time? If fifty years ago there was an obligation it could still be an offset?

THE COURT: Wow. I have not come across that.

MR. FRIEDBERG: There's no case law on this, Your Honor.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Yes, yes.

THE COURT: A hundred years ago, no limit?

MR. FRIEDBERG: As a setoff I believe that's -- if New York does not have any case law on it and there's no bankruptcy or U.S. District Court case law on it you look to state law and there's no interpretation --

THE COURT: Well, if there's no law then why are you so sure it comes out your way other than that's your client's argument?

MR. FRIEDBERG: Because that's my job.

THE COURT: Because that's your job. That part I understand. I used to be a litigator, Mr. Friedberg. All right. So as a practical matter what the creditor is arguing for is the right to receive a not very big distribution on its claim in this case, is that correct?

MR. FRIEDBERG: That is correct, Your Honor. 1 THE COURT: Okay. And the claim is otherwise 2 unenforceable and separate from that otherwise discharged, is 3 that correct? 4 5 MR. FRIEDBERG: It is now discharged, however, --THE COURT: Just trying to be --6 MR. FRIEDBERG: (Inaudible). 7 THE COURT: Just trying to get a practical sense of 8 things here. 9 MR. FRIEDBERG: Yeah, and we find ourselves in an odd 10 situation where the debtor is discharged, assets come into the 11 estate, no proofs of claims were filed because there were no 12 13 assets --THE COURT: Oh, there was a notice of discovery of 14 15 assets, it's number forty-one on the docket, I checked that actually just to be sure. 16 MR. FRIEDBERG: And we --17 THE COURT: We served it out. 18 MR. FRIEDBERG: And we properly filed a claim, we 19 20 filed our proof of claim, absolutely. THE COURT: And are there any other proof of claim 21 here? 22 23 MR. FRIEDBERG: Yes. THE COURT: What's the claim register look like? I 24 mean I'm being practical again and I suppose I should apologize 25

a little for that in an argument at such a high level of theory, but it's part of why we all have jobs, this is mine.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Your Honor, there's one other claim, there is one other claim, American Express --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FRIEDBERG: And it's small, under \$2,000.

THE COURT: I recall this, yes. The point's been made forcefully by debtor's Counsel that there's like a \$3,000 claim otherwise. All right. Really interesting issues. Mr. Friedberg, any - what else would you like to bring to the Court's attention?

MR. FRIEDBERG: I think we covered it all and I appreciate the opportunity to argue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's good, it's always good to hear an interesting and thoughtful argument and I benefit from having that from both sides here.

Mr. Dahiya, back to you. Tell me what the practical side of this, -- you know, there's a bunch of really interesting legal arguments here and they truly and deeply are interesting and they lie at the intersection of Supreme Court authority and New York State law and the idea that there could be rights that simply never go away, an interesting thing, but there's also a practical question in my mind which is that we have a not very - we have a small estate here, I suspect a certain amount of an administrative claim, we have a family and

a debtor who would just like to move on. It's always a pleasure to see you, Mr. Norton, but I'm sure at some point that you won't be disappointed if we're all done with this case.

If I disagree with the debtor then the claim stays on the register, it sounds like you could have a stipulation and maybe you'd like to talk about the terms of this and I'll give you a moment to do so. The claim would not otherwise be pursued in State Court, that they'll accept - and the discharge won't be objected to and they'll take the claim they get, you know, the distribution they get and we'll be done.

Mr. Dahiya, I'm eager to hear from you and you can begin or end, you can address that practical part of the picture whenever you'd like and everything else you'd like to address too.

MR. DAHIYA: Yes, Your Honor. There is absolutely no claim. I don't even (inaudible) state claim, state law, federal law.

THE COURT: Mr. Dahiya, what happens if I disagree?

If I disagree then don't we --

MR. DAHIYA: You disagree --

THE COURT: Have a claim that will be paid in part and then the debtor will receive a discharge and you've got an acknowledgement on the record from claimant's Counsel that it's an otherwise unenforceable claim?

MR. DAHIYA: What happens is - what happens now is if you sustain the claim they are confined to the Bankruptcy Court, they cannot go out and file an action against the debtor.

THE COURT: They have, Mr. Friedberg has acknowledged that I think.

MR. FRIEDBERG: I did, Your Honor, absolutely.

MR. DAHIYA: They cannot get anything, but the fact is they do not have a claim, Your Honor. This is (inaudible) simple case of dismissal of the claim. The original claims that they claimed, conversion without any right to property does not happen.

Now the other interesting part of this, Your Honor, the issue of (inaudible) the statute of limitations, Your Honor, the last piece of the reply, the statute of limitations in those causes of action is (inaudible) and begins to run from the date of the tort, not from the date of discovery or the exercise of (inaudible) to discovery. (Inaudible) the debtor was not (inaudible) of ECP.

In the case law they mention (inaudible) therein she had the property, she was holding the property. Even if my client is picking up the rent she's not holding the property (inaudible), I keep saying that, there's no property of ECP. The rents are there, she is holding them hypothetically and also I just put - I think I had put - there is an adjustment

(inaudible) that the debtor - not the debtor (inaudible) the borrower has got a judgment against the tenant for \$200,000.

(Inaudible) earlier, I don't know the docket number, I refiled it. There's a judgment of \$200,000, the tenants are not paying. In 2013 there is a judgment by the borrower against the tenant.

Mr. Friedberg is just speculating, Your Honor. This is incredible, absolutely not even (inaudible) that he talks about is viable here in the objection. The issue of pleading, the issue that I'm not mentioning (inaudible) the chief Judge of Southern District, a lot of judgments by him. There's no claim here.

THE COURT: No, Mr. Dahiya there is a proof of claim, we can agree that on the docket there is a proof of claim and you've made a motion to strike it. So --

MR. DAHIYA: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: There is - you can say there is no valid claim, you can say there's a claim that is time barred, but there --

MR. DAHIYA: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: Have been some very interesting highly technical, but that doesn't mean they aren't - they don't require consideration.

MR. DAHIYA: Absolutely, Your Honor. There's no - the claim does not have the presumption of validity, Your Honor.

There's no presumption of validity. I keep saying, Your Honor Midland was about --

THE COURT: Mr. Dahiya, isn't it true that there is a presumption, but you argue you have overcome it? I think that's the way --

MR. DAHIYA: Yes.

THE COURT: I think that's the - that would be the analysis.

MR. DAHIYA: You're right, you're right. I stand corrected, Your Honor. There's a proof of claim, the presumption of validity is gone, there has to (inaudible). They were supposed to attach the (inaudible), the presumption is gone, they have not been able to establish any standard of payment of this claim, Your Honor. There's nothing here, Your Honor. It is incredible what has happened here for - it's a monthly rent that (inaudible) and now they're going against the other family members and this is incredible.

(Inaudible) to say, Your Honor I have submitted -THE COURT: Okay. All right. Here's what - here's
what I'd like to do. I would - I would find it helpful to take
a very short break, and I shall do so, and as I do that I'm
going to direct -- you see the conference room? You know where
it is.

I'm sending you into it by Zoom, just Counsel. I think there's a framework here to get a resolution of this and

to me it makes a whole lot more sense than at least potentially trying to understand how the world looks from each of your respective positions.

This is not - this is - this is a challenge to a claim, this is not - this is not an objection to discharge, there's no - some big words have been used and some strong statements have been made in both directions.

At the end of the day I think it comes down to a proof of claim and whether the presumption of validity has been overcome and how a legal argument concerning the statute of limitations, very interesting legal argument, but a legal argument, the very interesting nature of which will not add value or subtract value from anyone's position in a year or six months or whenever. You know, --

MR. DAHIYA: Your Honor, --

of whether it's gonna be more or less hard to confirm the Chapter 13 plan. So I want you to confer on that because I can't rule out the possibility that there could be some portion of this claim that could be agreed to if everyone of course neither admitting nor denying any bad behavior, it doesn't have to be about bad behavior, and seeing where we are.

I began by saying I would like to take and intend to take a short break and I shall and we're going to put you in a Zoom room. Thankfully my colleague Ms. Jackson knows how to do

that, I don't. And please, I want you to approach it with a truly fresh look and see if there's something that beginning at 1:38 p.m. on July 6th, 2022, close to a decade after some of the matters at issue here whether there's something that makes sense going forward because I think there might be. All right.

So that's what we're gonna do. I shall double mute myself and see you in just a few minutes. You'll get all the

myself and see you in just a few minutes. You'll get all the time you need, but I'm directing you to take at least a couple of minutes. All right. Thank you so much.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Off the record).

(Recall began).

THE CLERK: Recalling the matters of Thema Norton, 17-42199 and 20-1113.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, my friends.

Welcome back. Is there any progress to report on any front,

Mr. Friedberg?

MR. FRIEDBERG: Your Honor, we were discussing a global settlement of all matters, but we have no - we have no agreement on the proof of claim.

THE COURT: All right. It would be encompassed it sounds like in that global universal settlement if you get there so don't fail to continue talking.

For my part I did take a look at my slightly yellowed McKinney's CPLR Section 214 for the first time in quite a

while. I do have the bound McKinney statutes in my chamber's library so I will continue to think about all the issues you've identified.

We're gonna have an adjourned date and we have a fairly soon date coming up in these cases. I need to think about the points you've made and it's possible I'll have an oral decision for you when we come back on July 17th, 19th.

Ms. Jackson, when's our next date? 19th, July 19th, probably 10:30, is that correct?

THE CLERK: (Inaudible).

THE COURT: That's gonna be a holding date and we'll see because if I'm going to have a long thing to say we'll have to find a different time. I'll invite you to file a status if there's any change in status, a status letter the day before. It's always helpful to know -- you've made -- your arguments have been really interesting and you have responded to some questions that were in my mind and I have to say you've raised some new questions for me so I thank you for that as well.

Anything further? Otherwise I'm gonna say July 19th at 10:30.

MR. FRIEDBERG: Yes, yes, Your Honor. We have also the motion to dismiss the adversary still pending. I'm wondering what we're doing with that.

THE COURT: When is that coming back to the Court? It's not on today's calendar.

MR. FRIEDBERG: I thought it was, I thought the Court 1 2 was going to rule today. THE COURT: Could be. I mean no, actually on the 3 ruling. We'll have to follow up on that and we'll - someone 4 5 will get back to you. Ms. Jackson will get back to you in a day or so because it shouldn't take long to figure out the 6 7 status of that, but I don't see it on today's calendar unless I'm overlooking something and it's a rather short calendar so 8 it would be hard to overlook I think, but we will follow up. 9 All right. I do recall the motion and you're right, it's been 10 out there for a while. All right. 11 So as for the moment, July 19th at 10:30. We will 12 follow up and get back to you on the status of the motion to 13 dismiss, thank you for that reminder, and pick up where we left 14 off then. All right. Thank you and thank you for very 15 interesting and very helpful arguments each of you. 16 17 MR. FRIEDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. DAHIYA: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: And feel better, Mr. Friedberg and, Mr. 19 20 Dahiya I hope you're well. 21 MR. FRIEDBERG: Much appreciated, much appreciated. MR. DAHIYA: May I be excused? 22 THE COURT: Yes, you may be excused. I'm sorry. 23 should have said that. 24

MR. DAHIYA: Thank you, Your Honor.

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CERTIFICATE

I, Lynn O'Reilly, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

6 Signature:

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< Dates >	19th 39:8	5/4/21 1:22	additional 25:5
5/3/22 1:20	1:38 38:3	5/7/21 1:22	Additionally 24:21
December 4th, 2017 15:3,	1.00 00.0	51 26:20	address 6:5, 13:8, 14:17,
23:16		54 26:8	15:17, 28:15, 29:1, 33:13,
July 17th, 19th 39:7	<2>	1.20.0	33:15
July 19th 39:8, 39:19, 40:12	2-1 17:14		addressed 11:25, 27:6, 27:12
July 21st 7:13	2-2 1:18	<6>	Adjourned 1:18, 1:20, 1:21,
July 6, 2022 1:7, 1:13	2/25/22 1:23	606 1:31	1:22, 6:18, 39:4
July 6th 38:3	20-01113 1:10	631 1:46	adjustment 34:25
July 7, 2022 42:12	20-1113 2:4, 38:14		ADL 1:43, 42:9
March 4th, 2021 17:14	2001 24:17		administrative 32:25
March, 2021 7:12	2011 8:18, 8:20, 11:11, 14:10,	<7>	admitted 25:7
May 2nd, 2017 23:15	16:2, 25:8, 26:23	7 3:20, 4:1, 37:16	admitting 37:21
May 3rd 6:20, 6:24	2012 8:6, 14:10, 16:2	7/21/21 1:23	advance 2:16, 2:18
September 22nd, 2016	2013 14:11, 16:3, 35:5	75 1:31	adversary 2:4, 3:21, 6:6,
14:21	2014 16:2, 18:12		13:14, 13:16, 13:20, 14:4,
September 3rd 16:2, 23:14	2016 18:13		14:16, 17:7, 24:11, 24:20,
September 3rd, 2014 14:12,	2017 14:23, 14:24, 17:9, 18:17,	< 9 >	25:3, 25:5, 39:22
14:20, 16:1, 16:5, 16:6,	18:18, 23:14	9/30/21 1:23	affirmative 28:8
16:9, 17:2, 17:4, 23:12,	2021 7:13	[1 1:21	affirmatively 29:19
24:13	2022 38:3	[148] 1:18	ago 30:7, 30:12
September 3rd, 2017 15:2,	20th 17:9	[14] 1:21	agree 15:24, 17:17, 21:19,
22:13	21117 1:37	[proceedings 41:2	28:6, 35:14
September, 2014 16:19, 17:3,	214 38:25		agreed 37:20
22:16	214.3 27:7		agreement 38:20
\$10,000 9:21	24 1:44, 42:10	<a>	al 1:12, 2:3
\$146,000 13:23	259 19:9	ability 16:5	Alabama 17:24, 17:25, 28:12,
\$2,000 32:6	277-7900 1:46	able 6:3, 36:13	28:13, 29:21
\$200,000 11:20, 35:2, 35:4	2nd 19:9	absent 25:4	alleged 24:20
\$206,000 13:23		Absolutely 31:20, 33:16, 34:7,	allegedly 17:15, 18:24
\$3,000 32:8		35:8, 35:24	allow 25:15
\$50,000 21:16, 22:3	<3>	acceleration 26:23	allowing 13:7, 13:13
	3/2/21 1:22	accept 33:9	although 7:23
-X 1:3, 1:9, 1:15	3001 13:13	accommodate 5:13	amended 7:13, 16:19
	353 26:8	accomplished 4:5	American 32:4
445	362 18:19	according 14:6, 18:24, 20:10,	amount 13:19, 13:22, 32:25
<1>	391 8:7	20:12, 23:20	analysis 28:7, 29:2, 36:8
1/28/22 1:23	3rd 26:20	accrued 26:17, 26:24	analyzing 17:24
1000 1:36		accurate 42:4	answer 16:5
10038 1:32	<4>	acknowledged 34:5	anticipated 21:13
10451 1:36		acknowledgement 33:24	Anyway 7:25, 9:21
10:30 39:9, 39:20, 40:12	4/29/22 1:23 406 19:8	Acquired 22:18	apologize 2:10, 2:15, 2:17,
11/23/23 1:23		across 21:8, 30:9	23:2, 25:23, 31:25
11729 1:45, 42:11	444 26:20 474 8:6	action 9:16, 19:8, 19:12, 25:15,	appearance 2:25, 3:1
12/08/20 1:22 12/15/20 1:22	4/4 8:6 4th 7:12	25:20, 34:3, 34:16 actions 24:25	APPEARANCES 1:28, 2:13
12/15/20 1:22 12/3/21 1:23	7111 1.12	actions 24:25 actually 10:4, 15:5, 31:16, 40:3	applied 24:25 applies 15:5
12/3/21 1:23 13 37:18		AD 26:20	applies 15:5 apply 12:18, 17:21, 19:10,
13 37:18 17-01037 17:7	<5>	add 2:13, 10:2, 11:15, 37:12	24:21, 26:1
17-01037 17:7 17-42199 1:4, 2:4, 38:14	5/21/21 1:22	addition 19:1	applying 29:8
11-42133 1.4, 2.4, 30.14	VIZ. 11.22	addition 19.1	applying 29.0

39:10

appointment 10:6, 10:9 Baltimore 1:37 brought 3:24 Banco 26:18, 26:22, 27:4 appreciate 32:13 appreciated 40:21 bankruptcies 14:25 Bankruptcy 1:1, 1:26, 12:9, approach 38:1 **April** 14:23, 18:16 14:21, 14:23, 14:24, 15:3, argue 18:6, 32:13, 36:4 18:12, 18:21, 18:23, 19:18, argued 6:19, 11:6 19:20, 23:15, 23:17, 24:25, arguing 30:23 26:13, 27:17, 29:6, 30:14, argument 3:22, 4:10, 5:2, 6:7, 34:2 7:6, 15:6, 15:18, 16:10, bar 11:7, 13:15 22:5, 22:15, 24:1, 24:16, barred 28:3, 35:18 25:11, 25:25, 26:16, 27:6, based 14:9, 14:10 30:19, 32:1, 32:15, 37:10, **basically** 7:19, 9:15, 13:18, 37:11, 37:12 18:11, 28:8 basing 20:6 arguments 7:11, 11:16, 20:15, basis 7:23, 13:18, 13:20, 14:3, 25:10, 32:19, 39:15, 40:16 arose 14:20, 16:1, 17:4, 18:12, 16:11 25:20 beautifully 8:8 **aspect** 24:18 become 8:9 assert 27:18, 28:8, 29:17 began 10:25, 37:23, 38:12 asserted 13:5, 27:15, 28:5 begin 11:9, 22:15, 33:13 assertion 26:9 **Beginning** 16:19, 22:4, 38:2 **begins** 34:16 asset 21:12, 21:24, 27:23 behalf 1:19, 13:1 assets 18:22, 18:24, 19:21, 20:3, 21:15, 23:19, 31:11, behavior 37:21, 37:22 31:13, 31:15 **believe** 9:15, 18:16, 20:5, assigned 9:11 21:10, 29:2, 30:13 assignment 9:13, 15:20, belong 10:11, 12:17 15:21, 25:2, 25:6 belongs 8:22, 8:23 **bench** 2:21 **assume** 13:3 **Assuming** 8:23 **benefit** 32:15 benefitted 9:16 attach 11:16, 11:17, 36:12 **best** 5:12 attached 7:20, 13:14, 24:12 attaches 25:1 **better** 40:19 big 20:7, 30:24, 37:6 attempt 24:21 attendants 5:13 bigger 6:5 attended 5:15 **bit** 15:11, 15:12, 15:18 attention 21:18, 32:11 borrower 16:20, 35:2, 35:5 **audio** 23:2 bottom 8:4 authority 32:21 bought 14:12, 15:7 avoidance 21:5 **bound** 39:1 aware 29:6 **box** 22:22 away 6:9, 9:11, 32:22 breach 8:24, 8:25, 25:12 break 2:23, 36:21, 37:24 **briefed** 6:19, 7:15, 24:16 briefly 5:20 Back 9:8, 14:15, 22:10, 23:2, briefs 9:11 bring 15:14, 27:1, 32:10 24:1, 24:9, 32:17, 38:16,

brings 18:8, 27:11

Brooklyn 1:6, 1:12

39:7, 39:24, 40:5, 40:13

bad 37:21, 37:22

building 22:24 client 5:20, 30:18, 34:22 **bunch** 32:18 close 38:3 **burden** 27:21 coffee 2:20 cold 2:16 colleague 37:25 < C > collect 18:7, 23:22, 27:10 calendar 2:3, 3:19, 39:25, collected 16:21, 16:24, 17:2, 40:7, 40:8 18:20 call 41:1 collection 7:9, 10:8 Calling 2:2 collections 16:21 Cann 1:12, 2:3 comes 30:18, 37:8 cases 19:19, 21:8, 25:14, 26:7, comfortable 5:21 29:6, 29:9, 29:10, 29:13, coming 39:5, 39:24 39:5 **commit** 26:14 caused 19:7, 19:8, 23:6 complain 12:8 **causes** 34:16 complaining 10:7 certain 32:25 Complaint 1:21, 7:21, 8:2, 9:7, certificate 4:19 13:14, 13:16, 13:20, 14:4, certify 42:3 14:7, 16:19, 17:6, 17:7, challenge 37:4 17:8, 19:17, 24:11, 24:20, chamber 39:1 25:3. 25:5 **change** 39:14 complaints 8:1 **Chapter** 3:20, 4:1, 37:16, complete 4:25, 7:1 37:18 complies 25:1 **charge** 12:16 **comply** 24:17 charted 28:1 concealing 19:21 check 4:5 concern 22:25 **checked** 31:15 concerning 37:10 **chief** 35:10 concluded 20:7 Christie 26:20 concluded] 41:2 chronologies 24:4 concluding 22:2 conducted 10:5 chronology 24:6, 24:10 Circle 1:36 **confer** 5:19, 37:18 cite 24:24, 26:7, 26:19 Conference 1:21, 3:21, 36:22 cited 25:14, 25:16 confined 12:11, 34:2 cites 26:10 confirm 37:17 City 26:7 confirming 4:25 civil 24:23 confused 7:21 claimant 33:24 Connected 2:5 claimed 14:14, 14:15, 34:11 consideration 35:23 claiming 15:25, 16:7, 24:14 contact 8:21 **claims** 8:2, 9:1, 9:11, 9:12, contains 13:16 11:12, 17:4, 18:2, 25:17, contention 13:14, 25:17 26:2, 26:13, 31:12, 34:10 context 6:5, 19:18, 19:19, 25:4 clarifies 17:5 continue 23:24, 38:23, 39:2 clarify 15:18, 16:9 continued 16:10 clear 13:15, 28:13, 29:18 continuing 16:12 **clearly** 20:4, 20:8, 24:6, 29:12 contract 8:25, 9:1, 9:2, 9:3, **CLERK** 2:2, 2:9, 3:6, 38:13, 9:6, 9:12, 11:14, 13:25,

25:12, 25:13, 25:21 control 27:3 controversion 24:20 conversation 13:23 Conversion 7:19, 7:24, 8:13, 13:21, 16:12, 16:13, 17:9, 18:14, 19:16, 19:17, 25:21, 26:6, 26:11, 26:17, 26:18, 26:21, 27:1, 34:11 converted 14:1, 14:3 copy 7:20, 11:16, 11:17 Correct 10:20, 16:15, 17:11, 20:2, 22:8, 22:9, 22:10, 22:17, 30:25, 31:1, 31:4, 39.9 corrected 36:10 coughing 2:17 Counsel 4:2, 32:8, 33:24, 36:24 couple 5:21, 10:15, 10:16, 38:8 course 6:3, 11:25, 20:21, 20:22, 21:18, 27:19, 37:20 Courtroom 23:1 covered 8:6, 32:12 CPLR 27:7, 38:25 **create** 11:22 **created** 9:1, 9:3 creating 9:19 Creditor 1:35, 24:17, 27:8, 27:20, 30:23 creditors 21:14 Crossway 1:44, 42:10 current 27:24

damage 9:1 **damage** 9:1 **damages** 16:7, 16:8 **Date** 6:21, 6:22, 11:10, 14:9, 14:11, 14:19, 15:1, 17:4, 17:12, 17:15, 34:17, 39:4, 39:5, 39:8, 39:11, 42:12 **day** 37:8, 39:14, 40:6 **days** 18:17, 22:24 **deadly** 21:6 **dealing** 13:5 **dealt** 13:4 **Debt** 7:9, 9:1, 9:3, 18:20, 26:25, 27:10

debtors 11:19, 25:23 decade 38:3 deception 19:7 decided 10:19, 29:8 decision 18:9, 27:13, 39:7 deemed 12:11, 27:19 deeply 32:19 Deer 1:45, 42:11 default 15:21, 15:23, 25:7 defendant 15:16, 19:10. 19:14, 25:19 defense 12:2, 27:15, 27:18, 28:5, 28:8, 28:17, 28:22, 28:23, 28:24 **delav** 19:7 demand 8:15, 8:16, 8:17, 8:19, 11:11, 11:13 demanded 26:23 **demands** 11:10 denied 8:16, 13:16 denying 37:21 described 29:7 describes 13:20 describing 13:21, 27:25 despite 7:25 detail 13:20, 13:21 determine 27:8 developed 19:22 difference 3:17, 28:16, 28:18 different 11:1, 12:16, 26:12, 26:15, 39:13 direct 36:22 directed 3:20 directing 38:8 directions 37:7 disagree 18:10, 21:22, 33:5, 33:19, 33:20, 33:21 disappointed 33:3 discharge 15:3, 19:20, 19:24, 20:2, 20:20, 20:23, 21:1, 21:20, 27:23, 33:9, 33:23, discharged 20:1, 21:9, 21:11, 21:21, 22:8, 23:16, 23:19, 31:3, 31:5, 31:11 disconnect 24:3 discourtesy 2:11 discovered 20:24 discovery 9:15, 9:17, 10:18,

13:3, 14:5, 31:14, 34:17,

34:18 discussing 38:18 dismiss 39:22, 40:14 dismissal 34:10 dismissed 14:23, 18:15 **distribution** 21:14, 21:21, 21:23, 30:24, 33:11 **District** 1:2, 30:15, 35:11 diversion 16:12 diverted 16:4. 23:12 docket 18:21, 31:15, 35:3, 35:14 doctrine 19:9 documents 27:5 doing 39:23 done 8:8, 9:19, 10:19, 33:3, 33:11 double 4:5, 38:6 doubt 21:5 down 37:8 **Drinking** 3:14 **Drive** 1:44, 42:10 Duane 25:14, 25:16

<E> e-mail 4:2 eager 5:22, 33:12 earlier 26:2, 26:3, 35:3 earliest 14:11, 14:19, 14:24, 14:25, 16:1, 17:3, 23:13 **easily** 8:24 **EASTERN** 1:2 **ECP** 1:18, 2:14, 13:1, 14:2, 14:9, 14:11, 14:15, 15:4, 16:8, 16:21, 19:17, 22:7, 23:18, 24:25, 25:6, 25:11, 25:22, 26:16, 26:17, 26:21, 26:25, 27:1, 27:3, 27:4, 27:5, 29:17, 34:19, 34:23 electronic 1:48 elements 13:17 **ELIZABETH** 1:25

ELIZABETH 1:25 encompassed 38:21 encourage 3:12 end 4:6, 33:13, 37:8 ended 17:12 enforceability 12:15 entered 26:15 entirely 26:12, 26:15 entry 25:18 equitable 19:4, 19:9 **ESS** 1:4, 1:10 establish 13:17, 36:13 **Established** 20:4, 20:10 establishes 25:6 estate 31:12, 32:24 estopped 19:6 estoppel 19:5, 19:9 et 1:12, 2:3 events 10:7 everyone 5:21, 5:23, 37:20 everything 4:3, 6:2, 12:23, 24:15, 33:14 exactly 9:5 example 29:16 exceed 9:21 **excuse** 15:15 excused 40:22, 40:23 exercise 34:18 exhibits 25:5 exist 26:12 **expiration** 15:1, 17:25, 18:3, 19:3, 22:12, 23:13, 27:10 expire 19:2, 23:17 expired 14:18, 18:7, 22:11, 28:10 expiring 23:23 Express 32:4 extended 18:16 extends 10:8 **extensively** 6:19, 7:15 **extent** 8:12 **extinguished** 17:23, 18:3, 25:18, 27:9, 28:11, 28:13, 28:17, 28:25, 29:12, 29:14 extinguishes 17:25 extinguishing 29:11 exuded 27:2

entitled 27:21

fail 25:10, 26:1, 26:17, 38:23 failed 16:20 fairly 24:15, 39:5 familiar 7:3 family 32:25, 36:17 Father 1:41, 5:15 favor 19:13 Federal 24:24, 33:18 feel 2:21, 40:19 few 38:7 **fifty** 30:6 fighting 2:16 figure 40:6 **file** 4:19, 4:25, 7:20, 27:16, 28:2, 34:3, 39:13 **Filed** 1:18, 7:12, 7:14, 7:18, 8:2, 8:18, 9:7, 9:14, 14:24, 17:14, 18:13, 19:17, 24:11, 27:14, 31:12, 31:19, 31:20 files 24:18 filing 19:12, 20:3, 23:15, 23:17 filings 8:1 Finally 7:14, 26:16 **find** 7:22, 18:2, 24:23, 29:10, 31:10, 36:20, 39:13 finding 7:22 fine 13:10, 23:6, 29:1 **First** 4:23, 6:5, 10:16, 14:20, 14:23, 17:13, 18:12, 19:18, 38:25 fit 12:3, 12:4 **fixed** 3:16 follow 40:4, 40:9, 40:13 forcefully 32:8 foregoing 42:3 forgetting 14:25 forth 9:9 **forty-one** 31:15 **forward** 14:10, 16:13, 16:14, 23:25. 38:5 founded 25:2 framework 36:25 fraud 19:7, 20:24, 21:7 fraudulent 20:3 free 2:21 fresh 38:2 friends 38:15 front 38:16 full 24:1 Funding 11:25, 18:9

funds 13:24, 15:22, 16:4, 23:12

< G >

gets 4:3 give 5:21, 29:16, 33:7 Glad 3:17, 4:24 glass 2:22 global 38:19, 38:22 goal 3:21 gonna 13:8, 37:17, 38:6, 39:4, 39:11, 39:19 greatest 22:12

grounds 7:2, 7:3, 7:8 guess 7:5, 11:23 guidance 29:13

green 22:22

< H >
hand 5:3, 5:5
happen 34:12
happened 22:19, 36:15
happens 22:6, 33:19, 34:1
hard 37:17, 40:9
harmed 16:8
haystack 7:22
head 20:18
hear 2:19, 3:11, 3:15, 3:17,

3:22, 5:4, 6:6, 7:4, 12:20, 12:21, 22:19, 23:4, 23:5, 23:9, 32:14, 33:12

heard 6:20

hearing 3:2, 3:5, 4:10, 10:17, 23:25

hearings 21:25 held 25:17, 26:14 help 2:22

helpful 2:12, 4:4, 5:1, 6:5, 7:1, 36:20, 39:15, 40:16

high 32:1 **highly** 35:21 **holder** 8:10

 $\textbf{holding} \ 26{:}10, \, 26{:}12, \, 34{:}21, \\$

34:22, 34:24, 39:11 **HONORABLE** 1:25

hope 2:19, 2:22, 2:23, 6:2, 17:5, 40:20

hospital 5:8, 5:9, 5:11 hundred 28:6, 30:12 hypothetically 12:13, 34:24

<|>

idea 32:21 identified 39:3

II 13:1

imagine 8:17 impediment 4:10 important 4:24, 12:20, 14:9

impression 6:23

Inc. 1:43

including 6:6, 19:6

incredible 35:8, 36:15, 36:17

infection 2:17 information 21:13 instructed 4:14 instrument 25:2

intend 37:23

intentional 19:10 intentionally 19:21

interest 9:9, 9:20, 13:22,

15:23, 21:25, 22:1, 27:5

interesting 32:9, 32:15, 32:19, 32:20, 32:22, 34:13, 35:21, 37:11, 37:12, 39:16, 40:16

interpretation 29:23, 30:16

interrupting 2:11 intersection 32:20 investigation 18:25

interpreted 27:7

invite 39:13

issue 3:25, 7:17, 8:5, 8:9, 9:5, 9:10, 12:5, 12:15, 12:16, 13:22, 19:4, 19:16, 19:21, 29:11, 34:14, 35:9, 35:10, 38:4

issues 3:22, 6:23, 7:4, 13:6, 32:9, 39:2

itself 25:5, 27:14

< J >

Jackson 2:12, 3:5, 37:25, 39:8, 40:5, 41:1 Jeremy 1:38, 12:25 job 24:5, 30:20, 30:21

jobs 32:2 join 6:3

Judge 1:26, 3:9, 5:24, 35:10

judgment 8:6, 8:7, 8:8, 9:2, 9:3, 10:3, 11:18, 25:12, 25:18, 26:11, 26:15, 35:2, 35:4, 35:5

judgments 35:11 judicata 25:9, 25:25, 26:1 juice 2:22

< K >

KARAMVIR 1:19, 1:33 keep 3:12, 34:23, 36:1 key 7:6 kind 7:21 knows 37:25

< L >

lack 25:10 Lane 1:31

language 16:19, 17:21 lapsed 15:6, 15:13

last 4:15, 10:2, 34:15 later 18:15, 18:17

latest 17:15

LAW 1:30, 7:17, 17:22, 17:24, 17:25, 18:2, 18:3, 19:2, 19:5, 26:10, 26:13, 28:10, 28:13, 28:19, 28:25, 29:8, 29:11, 29:22, 29:25, 30:10, 30:14, 30:15, 30:17, 32:21, 33:17, 33:18, 34:20

lawful 8:14 lawfully 9:24 lawyer 5:16 lease 11:16, 11:17

least 24:5, 27:23, 37:1, 38:8

left 10:13, 40:14

legal 7:7, 13:6, 22:5, 32:19, 37:10, 37:11

lender 15:22

less 37:17

letter 39:14 **level** 32:1

liability 26:23

library 39:2 lie 32:20

lie 32:20 light 19:3

lightly 21:6

limit 21:7, 30:12 mentioning 35:10 39:18, 42:11 merged 26:11 Next 6:21, 10:23, 22:7, 39:8, **Limitations** 7:8, 10:24, 10:25, 11:2, 11:7, 12:2, 14:18, merger 25:15 41.1 14:22, 15:1, 15:5, 15:7, merges 25:11 No. 3:6 15:9, 15:13, 15:14, 17:17, merits 6:11 nor 24:23, 37:21 mid-bankruptcy 22:13 normal 8:5 17:23, 18:1, 18:4, 18:16, 18:19, 19:2, 19:4, 19:6, Midland 11:25, 17:20, 17:21, **Norton** 1:6, 1:12, 1:19, 1:40, 18:9, 27:12, 28:2, 28:7, 22:11, 22:12, 23:13, 23:17, 2:3, 2:5, 3:8, 3:9, 3:11, 3:13, 23:23, 27:10, 27:16, 28:4, 29:8, 36:2 3:19, 5:2, 5:4, 5:5, 5:7, 5:10, 28:9, 28:10, 28:14, 28:19, Mill 1:36 5:14, 5:15, 5:20, 6:2, 14:1, 34:14, 34:15, 37:11 mind 32:23, 39:17 14:16, 14:20, 18:23, 19:5, line 3:6, 8:4 mine 32:2 20:16, 22:13, 26:5, 33:2, litigated 26:6 minutes 5:22, 38:7, 38:9 38:13 noted 3:25 litigation 26:2, 26:4 misrepresentation 19:7, 19:11. 19:14 **Nothing** 6:8, 6:13, 8:5, 10:2, litigator 30:22 moment 13:9, 18:17, 33:8, little 15:11, 15:12, 15:18, 32:1 10:12, 10:13, 16:2, 28:19, **LLC** 1:30, 8:6, 13:1, 14:2 40:12 36:14 **monthly** 36:16 notice 8:21, 13:18, 18:22, loan 14:10, 14:13, 14:15, 15:8, 16:6, 16:8, 26:19, 27:5 months 18:15, 37:14 31.14 logic 18:11 mortgage 11:14 number 2:4, 11:20, 31:15, 35:3 numerous 20:15 long 29:19, 39:12, 40:6 **Motion** 1:18, 3:20, 3:23, 3:24, **look** 17:22, 30:15, 31:24, 38:2, 6:4, 6:13, 6:14, 6:17, 6:24, **NY** 1:6, 1:12, 1:32 38:24 7:14, 7:15, 35:15, 39:22, looked 8:1 40:10, 40:13 < 0 > looking 16:18, 18:21, 23:24 motions 7:13 looks 4:21, 37:2 **O'brien** 26:7 move 24:1, 33:1 **loose** 4:6 **Ms** 2:12, 3:5, 5:14, 14:1, 14:16, **O'reilly** 42:3 objected 33:10 lot 35:11, 37:1 14:20, 18:23, 19:5, 20:16, low 13:13, 13:15 22:13, 37:25, 39:8, 40:5, objection 27:20, 35:9, 37:5 Lynn 42:3 41.1 **obligation** 28:3, 30:7 mute 23:1, 23:7, 38:6 obstacle 7:8, 11:7 **muted** 3:7 obtained 11:18, 19:20, 20:2 < M >myself 23:1, 38:7 obviously 14:21 Madeline 8:11 occurred 26:18, 26:22, 26:24 Maiden 1:31 odd 31:10 < N >OFFICES 1:30 main 2:3. 13:15 **March** 17:9 **name** 2:6 offline 5:20 massive 20:24, 21:7 nature 9:22, 17:5, 37:12 offset 30:7 often 5:14 material 19:10 **need** 2:23, 9:23, 12:14, 18:22, Matter 1:4, 1:10, 6:22, 13:2, 23:7, 27:18, 30:3, 38:8, 39:5 Okay 2:20, 4:18, 5:25, 6:2,

22:5, 22:6, 28:18, 30:23,

matters 2:2, 38:4, 38:13, 38:19

Mckinney 38:25, 39:1

mean 9:23, 28:18, 28:19,

31:25, 35:22, 40:3

41:1

MD 1:37

means 12:7

members 36:17

mention 34:20

needed 10:18 6:16, 31:2, 32:5, 36:19 needle 7:22 Once 2:11, 24:13, 28:13 Nehemiah 26:4 One 2:2, 7:11, 11:11, 18:11, neither 37:21 22:24, 24:24, 28:6, 32:3, nevertheless 18:8 32.4 opportunity 32:13 **New** 1:2, 1:32, 1:45, 8:25, 18:3, opposition 7:5 19:2, 19:5, 19:8, 26:8, 26:13, 27:7, 28:15, 28:19, oral 39:7 28:25, 29:7, 29:8, 29:9, orange 2:22 29:10, 29:25, 30:13, 32:21, order 13:10, 15:2

original 34:10 originally 6:20 Otherwise 31:2, 31:3, 32:9, 33:8, 33:25, 39:19 ourselves 31:10 outside 12:10 overcome 11:8, 36:4, 37:10 overlap 24:8 overlook 40:9 overlooking 40:8 own 25:4 owned 18:24, 26:19 owner 8:13, 8:14, 20:4 ownership 8:15, 8:22, 14:15, 15:23, 17:12, 25:6, 27:2

< P > p.m. 38:3 page 21:18 paid 22:7, 33:22 **papers** 24:19 paperwork 8:18 paragraph 17:8 paramount 21:18 Park 1:45, 42:11 part 9:10, 22:7, 25:19, 30:21, 32:2, 33:13, 33:22, 34:13, 38:24 participation 5:13 parties 2:6, 5:13, 6:23, 10:16, 11:24, 24:4, 25:12, 26:12, 26:15 party 8:14, 25:13, 26:3 passed 17:23 passes 28:14 past 5:14 path 28:1 Paul 25:15 pay 15:22, 22:2 paying 35:5 payment 11:13, 11:14, 27:8, 27:21, 27:22, 28:17, 28:22, 28:24, 29:3, 36:14 payments 9:9, 9:12 **PC** 1:35 pending 39:22 percent 28:7 Perhaps 7:1, 21:21

period 27:10

quite 15:23, 38:25

raised 5:5, 11:24, 19:22, 26:2,

< R >

periods 11:2 perpetrated 21:7 personally 14:1, 14:3 phone 25:24 phrase 22:5 pick 40:14 picking 34:22 picture 33:14 piece 34:15 **place** 8:13 placed 24:22, 27:4 plaintiff 19:11, 19:13, 19:15 plan 37:18 pleading 24:22, 35:9 Please 2:6, 2:20, 2:21, 2:25, 3:1, 4:23, 6:12, 13:11, 15:19, 23:10, 23:24, 38:1 pleasure 33:2 **point** 2:23, 3:25, 6:15, 7:17, 10:18, 11:21, 13:2, 15:24, 21:12. 22:14. 27:11. 29:1. 32:7. 33:2 pointed 11:1 **points** 7:6, 39:6 Popular 26:18, 26:22, 27:4 portion 37:19 position 10:16, 10:18, 37:13 positions 24:6, 37:3 possibility 37:19 possible 15:1, 22:12, 23:13, 39:6 potentially 37:1 practical 22:5, 22:6, 28:18, 30:23, 31:8, 31:25, 32:17, 32:23, 33:13 practice 29:25, 30:2 pre 16:4, 17:3 Pre-trial 1:21 precludes 25:25 predecessor 26:23 predecessors 16:7 preferences 5:23 preliminary 13:1 prepared 8:3 PRESENT 1:40, 16:20, 17:8 presented 24:4 presumption 35:25, 36:1, 36:4, 36:11, 36:12, 37:9 pretrial 3:21 pretty 20:7

prevented 19:11, 19:14 previous 9:8 previously 16:24 prima 27:19 prior 6:21, 6:22, 10:17, 14:15, 21:8, 23:17, 24:14, 26:24 **probably** 20:23, 21:2, 39:8 problem 17:16 proceed 5:2, 5:17, 5:22, 6:12, 13:11 proceeding 2:4, 3:21, 6:6, 14:16, 17:7, 24:12 Proceedings 1:48, 9:22, 42:4 produced 1:49 progress 3:23, 21:19, 38:16 **Proof** 1:18, 3:20, 3:23, 7:12, 7:18, 9:14, 9:20, 11:15, 12:1, 13:3, 13:5, 13:7, 13:13, 18:22, 24:12, 24:17, 24:18, 24:25, 27:14, 27:16, 27:19, 28:2, 28:9, 31:20, 31:21, 35:13, 35:14, 36:10, 37:8, 38:20 proofs 31:12 proper 11:12, 12:13, 12:14 properly 24:22, 31:19 Property 2:14, 8:10, 8:13, 10:4, 10:10, 13:1, 17:12, 26:21, 27:3, 34:11, 34:21, 34:22, 34:23 prosecuted 9:8 prospective 15:15 **prove** 24:18 provided 25:4 purchase 16:8 purchased 14:10 pursue 15:4 pursued 33:9 put 13:18, 23:1, 34:25, 37:24 < Q > question 10:23, 11:3, 11:4, 11:5, 11:8, 11:23, 12:1, 22:4, 32:23, 37:16 questions 10:1, 10:12, 10:15,

13:8, 39:17, 39:18

quick 23:7

quickly 23:1

quirks 22:24

39:17 rather 40:8 Re 1:4, 1:10, 1:21, 8:6 read 10:3 Reade 25:14, 25:16 ready 10:19 **Really** 29:1, 32:9, 32:18, 39:16 reason 5:1, 5:6, 22:25 Recall 21:8, 21:17, 21:25, 32:7, 38:12. 40:10 Recalling 38:13 receive 30:24, 33:23 receiver 10:6, 10:9 record 2:12, 2:13, 2:25, 3:1, 5:1, 7:2, 20:14, 20:17, 27:24, 33:24, 38:11, 42:4 recorded 1:48 recording 1:48 recover 23:11 **refers** 17:8 refiled 18:17, 35:3 refraining 19:8 refused 16:20, 17:16 register 31:24, 33:6 related 25:25 relating 26:16 release 10:4 relief 7:3 rely 10:23 relying 24:19 **remains** 8:12 remember 4:17 remembers 18:21 remind 2:6 reminder 40:14 remit 16:20 remitted 17:2 rent 8:20, 8:21, 15:21, 25:6, 34:22, 36:16 rental 9:9, 9:12 **rents** 8:9, 8:11, 14:14, 14:15, 15:20, 15:23, 16:3, 16:13, 16:21, 17:1, 17:16, 19:17, 25:3, 25:6, 26:22, 27:3, 34:24

repeat 22:23, 23:9 reply 34:15 report 18:24, 38:16 repose 15:15 require 35:23 required 13:17, 24:18 requires 15:21 **Res** 25:9, 25:25, 26:1 resolution 36:25 respect 3:23, 25:9, 25:19 respective 24:6, 37:3 respectively 5:16 respects 5:23 respiratory 2:16 responded 39:16 response 8:3, 23:25 **restate** 18:11 rested 7:22 **retains** 27:20 return 17:16 revenue 27:9 **revive** 15:14 revived 15:7 revoke 20:23, 20:25 rightful 26:21, 27:3 rights 32:22 ringing 25:24 risk 22:4 **River** 26:4 **Rock** 26:4 room 36:22, 37:25 Rule 13:13, 24:17, 37:19, 40:2 ruled 19:13, 29:7 rules 25:1 ruling 40:4 Run 1:36, 10:25, 11:2, 11:9, 22:15, 34:16

< \$ > S. 1:25 safeguards 12:9 sale 21:12, 21:24, 21:25 sanctions 12:7 saw 20:16 saying 28:2, 34:23, 36:1, 37:23 says 18:2, 19:3, 24:12, 28:25 schedule 20:3 Second 4:24, 14:24, 18:23, 19:19

29:14, 29:18

sufficient 13:15

Suite 1:31, 1:36

summarize 7:2

sued 14:2, 18:13, 29:17

suit 27:9, 28:23, 28:24

Section 27:7, 38:25 seeing 3:18, 37:22 **seek** 7:3 seeking 23:11, 23:22 seem 4:3, 15:10, 15:12, 17:16 seems 4:6, 21:24, 22:7, 23:2, 27:12 **sending** 36:24 sense 7:5, 31:8, 37:1, 38:5 separate 25:12, 31:3 **September** 18:12, 18:13, 18:17 series 25:20 serious 21:6 serve 4:7, 4:12, 4:15 served 4:2, 4:4, 31:18 **service** 1:49, 3:25, 4:1, 4:3, 4:5, 4:18, 4:19, 4:20, 4:24 **Services** 1:43, 42:9 set 29:17, 29:19 **setoff** 30:13 **settlement** 38:19. 38:22 several 6:18 **shall** 6:6, 12:21, 36:21, 37:24, 38.6 **short** 36:21, 37:24, 40:8 shouldn't 40:6 show 3:6, 27:21 side 32:18 sides 32:16 Signature 42:7 **simple** 10:2, 34:10 **simply** 12:5, 18:4, 29:14, 32:22 sit 21:9 **situation** 12:1, 31:11 six 18:15, 37:13 slightly 38:24 small 32:6, 32:24 sneezing 2:17 sold 21:15 **solely** 24:11 somebody 22:2 **somehow** 15:14 someone 40:4 soon 39:5 **sorry** 2:19, 5:9, 22:20, 40:23 sort 21:23. 24:4 **sound** 1:48 sounds 17:14, 27:25, 33:6,

38:22

Southern 35:11 Southside 8:6 speaking 2:7, 21:5 speaks 27:13 speculating 35:7 speculation 11:21 St. 25:15 **stand** 36:9 standard 13:7, 13:12, 24:22, 24:24, 29:25, 36:13 standing 25:10, 26:17, 27:1 start 2:17, 11:2 **started** 9:16, 11:11, 11:13 **State** 2:6, 8:11, 8:25, 9:16, 17:22, 18:3, 19:9, 27:24, 28:10, 28:11, 29:7, 29:11, 29:14, 30:15, 32:21, 33:9, 33.17 statement 20:7 statements 37:7 **STATES** 1:1, 1:26, 8:10 **status** 19:23, 39:13, 39:14, 40:7, 40:13 **statute** 7:8, 10:24, 10:25, 11:7, 11:8, 12:1, 14:18, 14:22, 15:1, 15:4, 15:7, 15:9, 15:13, 15:14, 17:17, 17:19, 17:22, 18:1, 18:4, 18:7, 18:16, 18:19, 19:1, 19:4, 19:6, 22:11, 22:12, 23:13, 23:16, 23:23, 27:16, 28:4, 28:9, 28:14, 28:18, 29:13, 34:14, 34:15, 37:10 statutes 39:1 **stayed** 15:2 **stays** 33:5 stipulation 33:6 **STONG** 1:25

straight 6:9

strong 37:6

subject 23:23

submitted 36:18

subsequently 7:13

subtract 37:13

successfully 9:19

substance 7:7, 27:13

stricken 7:10, 21:20, 22:6

subsequent 19:10, 19:14

sue 18:4, 18:7, 29:2, 29:5,

strike 3:24, 21:22, 35:15

summarized 12:23 support 25:16, 26:8 supported 24:11 supports 29:22 **suppose** 31:25 supposed 11:17, 36:12 **Supreme** 11:25, 12:6, 18:8, 27:12, 28:1, 32:20 **suspect** 32:24 sustain 34:2 Syracuse 26:8 <T> **T.** 1:6, 1:19, 2:3 talks 8:9, 12:6, 35:8 **Tech** 26:5 technical 35:22 tenant 16:21, 26:22, 27:3, 35:2, 35:6 tenants 35:4 terms 33:7 terrible 2:16 Thankfully 37:25 **that--** 16:22 Thema 1:6, 1:19, 2:3, 3:19, 38:13 theory 32:2 **therein** 34:20 they'll 33:9, 33:10 they've 9:19 thinks 5:10 though 18:20, 29:18 thoughtful 32:15 three 17:15, 17:19, 25:12 timely 12:12, 19:8, 19:11, 19:17 title 8:12, 10:4 today 3:19, 3:22, 4:11, 6:25, 7:15, 39:25, 40:2, 40:7 tolled 14:22 tolling 14:25 tone 22:21, 23:1, 23:7 took 10:10

top 20:18 tort 25:11, 26:10, 26:13, 34:17 torts 26:14 touch 5:7 towards 26:5 transaction 15:13, 25:19 transactions 25:20 Transcriber 1:43 transcript 1:49, 42:3 **Transcription** 1:43, 1:49, 42:9 transfer 26:24 transferred 27:4 tried 5:7 triple 4:5 true 13:5, 28:20, 36:3, 42:4 truly 32:19, 38:2 Trustee 4:1, 4:2, 4:3, 9:14, 9:20, 18:25, 19:22, 20:5, 20:10, 20:12, 20:15, 20:16, 20:22, 20:23, 20:25, 21:12, 21:15, 23:20 trying 31:6, 31:8, 37:2 turn 10:23 turned 16:25 turns 7:7, 27:22 **twenty** 18:17 twenty-eight 17:8 two 2:2, 13:17, 24:4 < U > ultimately 22:1, 27:21

unbounded 30:6 uncontroverted 14:4 understand 7:23, 7:24, 9:23, 10:15, 10:24, 24:5, 30:22, unenforceable 31:3, 33:25 **UNITED** 1:1, 1:26 universal 38:22 unlawfully 27:2 **Unless** 5:1, 10:1, 10:12, 23:1, 40:7 **unlike** 8:10 **until** 10:4 updated 4:19 **upper** 2:16 using 9:7 utilized 9:18

< V >

v. 1:12

valid 13:17, 19:3, 27:19, 35:17 validity 35:25, 36:1, 36:11,

37:9

value 37:13

versus 2:3, 25:15, 26:7, 26:19

via 28:3

viable 11:12, 11:22, 35:9

voices 3:18

< W >

waived 13:2

wanna 5:23, 10:15, 10:24,

23:25

wanted 24:16

warranted 9:17

water 2:21, 3:14

Welcome 6:3, 38:16

Whatever 11:20, 13:10, 22:2,

27:22

whatsoever 15:15

whenever 33:14, 37:14

 $\boldsymbol{whether}\ 17{:}23,\ 22{:}1,\ 27{:}8,$

37:9, 37:17, 38:4

whole 37:1

whom 20:11

wife 5:10

will 2:20, 4:7, 21:13, 21:21,

21:23, 22:25, 33:22, 33:23,

37:12, 39:2, 40:5, 40:9,

40:12

willing 22:2

wish 5:14

without 5:17, 34:11

wondering 39:23

words 37:6

work 3:22

works 13:10

world 37:2

worth 13:23

Wow 30:9

wrongdoing 19:16

< Y >

year 17:19, 21:1, 37:13 **years** 17:15, 30:7, 30:12

yellowed 38:24

York 1:2, 1:32, 1:45, 8:25, 18:3, 19:2, 19:5, 19:8, 26:8, 26:13, 27:7, 28:15, 28:19, 28:25, 29:7, 29:8, 29:9, 29:10, 30:1, 30:14, 32:21, 42:11

< Z >

Zoom 36:24, 37:25